




The Sacred Object: 
Anne Carson and Simone Weil
Elizabeth Coles
Este artículo examina la relación entre la lectura crítica y el objeto crítico en la 
obra de la poeta y ensayista canadiense Anne Carson, principalmente los textos 
que surgen de su largo acercamiento a los escritos de la filósofa y mística cris-
tiana Simone Weil. Mi lectura de Carson se centra en los deseos conflictuales 
de la relación crítica que se encuentran confesados y no confesados en su obra, 
y en las formas de intimidad que sus respuestas logran con la obra de Weil. 
Agudizadas por su encuentro con el pensamiento y la fe de Weil, las preguntas 
de Carson para la crítica ―sobre sus propios objetos y la resistencia de ellos a 
la interpretación, sobre la distinción entre crítica y literatura, y sobre la vanidad 
de la estética de la crítica misma― encuentran su articulación en varios géne-
ros de la escritura: estudiando la complicidad de cada uno de estos con Weil, y 
la capacidad de cada uno a radicalizar sus cuestiones, llego a unas conclusions 
propias para la crítica literaria.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Anne Carson, Simone Weil, interpretación, crítica litera-
ria, poesía contemporánea, teología, misticismo. 
This paper examines the relationship between critical reading and the critical 
object in the work of the contemporary Canadian poet and essayist Anne Car-
son, principally the texts that emerge from her long-standing engagement with 
the writings of philosopher and Christian mystic Simone Weil. My reading of 
Carson addresses the conflicting desires of critical relationship that go con-
fessed and unconfessed in her work, and the forms of intimacy her responses 
are able to achieve with the Weil oeuvre. Sharpened by their encounter with 
Weil’s thinking and with her faith, Carson’s questions for criticism ―on its 
own objects and their resistance to interpretation, on the criticism/literature 
distinction, and on the vanity of criticism’s aesthetics― find articulation in 
various genres of writing. Studying the complicity of each of these with Weil 
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and the capacity of each to radicalize her concerns, brings my paper toward 
some conclusions of its own for literary criticism.
KEYWORDS: Anne Carson, Simone Weil, interpretation, literary criticism, 
contemporary poetry, theology, mysticism.
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The Sacred Object: Anne Carson and Simone Weil
Think of the Greek preposition πρὸϛ. When 
used with the accusative case, this preposi-
tion means “toward, upon, against, with, 
ready for, face to face, engaging, concerning, 
touching, in reply to, in respect of, compared 
with, according to, as accompaniment for.” It 
is the preposition chosen by John the Evan-
gelist to describe the relationship between 
God and The Word in the first verse of the 
first chapter of his Revelation: 
πρὸϛ Θεόν
“And The Word was with God” is how the 
usual translation goes. What kind of withness 
is it? 
ANNE CARSON, Economy of the Unlost
The intimacy of God and Word is a conversation of one and a solitude 
of two. Inside the full line from John 1:1 (“In the beginning was The 
Word, and The Word was with God, and The Word was God”), “with” 
1  Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Postdoctoral Scholarships Program of the Coordi-
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ripples out in both directions like a question: what is this moment of 
recognition, a flash of eye contact inside the monad of God and Word? 
“Face to face, engaging, concerning, touching” and finally “withness” 
is how the Canadian poet, critic and scholar Anne Carson describes the 
event. Yet the question to which she leads us ―“what kind of withness 
is it?”― is not addressed to the theologian, the philosopher or even to 
the reader of the critical work in which it appears― Economy of the 
Unlost: Reading Simonides of Keos with Paul Celan (1999).2 The ques-
tion, Carson hints earlier on in her short and casuistic preface, “Note on 
Method”, is for “academic writing”: 
There is too much self in my writing. Do you know the term Lukács uses 
to describe aesthetic structure? Eine fensterlose Monade. I do not want 
to be a windowless monad ―my training and trainers opposed subjec-
tivity strongly, I have struggled since the beginning to drive my thought 
out into the landscape of science and fact where other people converse 
logically and exchange judgments― but I go blind out there. So writing 
involves some dashing back and forth between that darkening landscape 
where facticity is strewn and a windowless room cleared of everything 
I do not know. […] Lukács is prescribing a room for aesthetic work; it 
would be a gesture of false consciousness to say academic writing can 
take place there. And yet, you know as well as I, thought finds itself 
in this room in its best moments ―locked inside its own pressures… 
(Economy of the Unlost, VII).
The question “withness” is engaged to ask in Economy of the Unlost 
is what kind of relationship academic writing assumes over, against and 
with its objects of desire, a question Carson folds back onto the book 
itself at the point of its own defining “with” ―Economy of the Unlost: 
Reading Simonides of Keos with Paul Celan. A critique of the finesses 
of “thought”, “subjectivity” and “aesthetic work” in the relationships 
2 The word “withness” appears again in Carson in a more directly theological sense. 
In her poem “God’s Christ Theory”, Christ’s incarnation is received “Not [as] passion 
but com-passion. / Com―means “with.” / What kind of withness would that be?” See 
Anne Carson, Glass, Irony and God 51. Also see André Furlani’s discussion of Eco-
nomy of the Unlost in “Reading Paul Celan with Anne Carson: ‘What kind of withness 
would that be?’”, Canadian Literature, 176 (Spring 2003), 84-104.
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of academic writing spool out of Carson’s reference to John the Evan-
gelist. In this paper I propose a deeper complicity in Carson between 
certain problems of theology and certain problems of criticism as she 
sees and perhaps also does not see them, a complicity staged in Car-
son’s ongoing poetic and critical reading of the French philosopher and 
Christian mystic Simone Weil (1909-1943). The questions Carson asks 
of the practices of criticism and academic writing are, like the questions 
I will be asking here, sharpened and radicalized both by Carson’s read-
ing of Weil and by the dilemmas of mystical thinking that shape them: 
dilemmas for the writer and especially the critic, and for the objects of 
critical and religious desire. 
The paper is divided into three sections. The first outlines Carson’s 
critical response to Simone Weil in a reading of one of Carson’s most 
recent critical essays, “Decreation” (2005). This homage to Weil’s con-
cerns, I suggest, finds itself curiously at home in Carson’s wider critical 
project. The second section of the paper explores Weil’s own thought 
on the question of interpretation as a relationship, and argues for the 
coincidence of Weil and Carson on a point that has more to offer critical 
practice than mystic theology. Weil’s response to an absent object ―the 
Judeo-Christian God― offers a way of thinking about what is at stake 
in interpreting “present” ones in literary criticism and critical aesthet-
ics; her place in Carson’s reflections on critical relationship also begs 
the question of what God and mystic theology are doing in contempo-
rary, materialist and what we might call post-faith critical thought. The 
final section considers what Carson’s poetic response to Weil achieves 
that her critical writing does not and perhaps cannot. At the heart of 
both forms of response is an effort to know and preserve literary objects 
of desire in the act of writing about them, a concern shared by Weil’s 
preoccupations with an object whose secrecy or outright absence in-
spires comparable practices of desire and belief.
I
Carson is known perhaps first and foremost for her formal experimen-
tation. It is commonplace in Carson to find the functions of poem and 
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essay (as we might expect them) changing places: essays in verse as 
well as academic prose, and poems doing the work of literary criticism. 
“People make trouble out of that border [between poetry and its inter-
pretation]. I practically don’t separate them”, she confesses in an inter-
view: “I put scholarly projects and so-called creative projects side-by-
side in my workspace and I cross back and forth between them or move 
sentences back and forth between them, and so cause them to perme-
ate one another” (Kevin McNeilly, “Gifts and Questions”, 14). Having 
said this, few commentaries on Carson’s work go beyond description 
of the fact of her formal or generic “hybridity”.3 In Carson’s relatively 
slim reception to date, it appears as though a poet who is also a scholar 
makes only a formal gesture when she imports the rigours and dilem-
mas of scholarship into a work of verse, or when a work of scholarship 
swaps expository language for a language closer to its critical object’s 
―as is so often the case in Carson.4 On their own, the formal qualities 
of this formal interpenetration tell us very little about Carson’s project 
as a critic and, for that matter, as a poet; yet they are the vocabulary of 
a critical ethics at the heart of Carson, one that binds her project to the 
worldly and otherworldly ethics of Simone Weil.
In Economy of the Unlost, the “withness” of Simonides of Keos and 
Paul Celan ―and of Carson’s own critical accompaniment of the pair― 
is presented as a matter of attention: “Attention is a task we share, you 
and I. To keep attention strong means to keep it from settling. Partly 
for this reason I have chosen to talk about two men at once. They keep 
each other from settling, they are side by side in a conversation and 
yet no conversation takes place” (Economy of the Unlost, VIII). The 
methodological announcement, ambivalently received in reviews of the 
work, serves Carson’s tentative definitions (and the book’s less tenta-
tive actions) of what criticism should be doing: keeping its object from 
3 See Ian Rae, “Dazzling Hybrids”, Canadian Literature, 166 (Autumn 2000), 17-
43. Rae considers the formal and generic qualities of Carson’s verse novel Autobio-
graphy of Red (1998). See also Ian Rae, From Cohen to Carson: The Poet’s Novel in 
Canada. 
4 An exception is André Furlani, “Reading Paul Celan with Anne Carson: ‘What kind 
of withness would that be?’”, 84-94. 
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“settling”.5 At stake, Carson announces, is the kind of contact criticism 
is ―between the critic and the objects of her attention, and between 
those objects as they meet and touch in the critical work. She writes 
of a fear of insular and self-regarding subjectivity in criticism ―“Eine 
fensterlose Monade. I do not want to be a windowless monad.”― yet in 
the space Lukács tells us is proper to aesthetic work (to poetry and not, 
we imagine, to criticism in this case), Carson places her critical reading 
of Celan and Simonides.6 
At once abashed and luxuriant, Carson’s confession invites us to 
believe in her critical project as a deliberate and fully self-conscious 
form of intimacy (both with and between Celan and Simonides), and 
suggests this intimacy is not only a personal necessity but a matter of 
critical quality ―of thought’s “best moments”. Carson’s intimacy per-
suades at the level of sound, symbol and rhythm as her readings of criti-
cal objects momentarily take on their poetics, mimicking and extending 
their ways of meaning.7 The same windowlessness (a form of intimacy 
and enclosure critiqued inside Lukács’s materialism) is a proud feature 
5 See e.g. Elizabeth Lowry’s review of Economy of the Unlost, “The man who would 
put to sea on a bathmat”, London Review of Books, Lowry praises Carson’s critical 
project but attacks the casuistic “Note on Method” as “staggeringly pretentious”, “a 
parody of the worst kind of academic preciousness”. See also Steven J. Willet’s review 
in Bryn Marw Classical Review (2000. 02. 28), accessed on 20.11.2012 at http://bmcr.
brynmawr.edu/2000/2000-02-28.html. Willet accuses Carson of academic “hubris” in 
her comparative work.
6 Carson references Lukács’s treatise on aesthetics “Die Subjekt-Objekt Beziehung in 
der Ästhetik”, published in the journal Logos in 1917. Lukács’s writings on Modernism 
(including “The Ideology of Modernism” in The Meaning of Contemporary Realism, 
and Realism in Our Time: Literature and the Class Struggle ) discuss the socio-political 
possibilities offered by Realism to politically insular “aesthetic work”. For discussion 
of Lukács on Modernism see Eugene Lunn, Marxism and Modernism: an Historical 
Study of Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin, and Adorno. 
7 Carson’s reading of Celan’s “Matière de Bretagne” replicates the poem’s aural and 
visual palette, its store of images and its metrical pulse, releasing them as the poem’s 
“own” critical resource. “The poem”, she says, “has the rhythm of a bloodsail, sailing 
forward in waves from gorselight to gorselight to you”. The poem guides Carson’s criti-
cal vocabulary as the “rhythm of a bloodsail” [“das Blutsegel”] ―the poem’s distincti-
ve dactylic pulse― continues in “gorselight to gorselight to you”. Carrying the pulse of 
Celan’s “the bloodsail is heading for you” [“das Blutsegel hält auf dich zu”], Carson’s 
“Redder than red, redder than the blood of a boar in a dream” does not directly quote but 
rather inhabits the same “dream” as the poem.
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of Carson’s readings of Simone Weil, the lyrist Sappho and the French 
fourteenth-century mystic Marguerite Porete in “Decreation”, an essay 
whose leading concern is precisely this form of intimacy. Yet the essay, 
Carson’s most forceful theorization to date of “withness” and the rela-
tionships of writing, inherits its strictures and arguments from writers 
whose object of desire and interpretation is a divine one.8 
Carson’s compendium of poetry, critical essays and opera libretti, 
Decreation (of which “Decreation” is the title essay) is named after one 
of Simone Weil’s most conspicuous and least comprehensible terms, 
“décréation”. The closest we come to a definition of “décréation” in 
Weil is: 
[...] to make something created pass into the uncreated (faire passer du 
créé dans l’incréé). An imaginary divinity has been given to man so that 
he may strip himself of it like Christ did of his real divinity. [...] We par-
ticipate in the creation of the world by decreating ourselves (Gravity and 
Grace, 32-33; La Pesanteur et la grace, 36).9 
In the case of relationship to God, decreation asks for the undoing of 
the subject because her presence to the object ―God― is too substantial. 
The problem of “too much self” that Carson sets out in Economy of the 
Unlost is one of Weil’s constitutional concerns, a condition of Creation 
(and creation) that can be reimbursed, as Weil has it. However, while in 
Economy of the Unlost “too much self” is a justification of the author’s 
8 Theorizations of a similar nature to “withness” include Martin Heidegger’s Mitsein 
(Being-with), Paul Celan’s Begegnung (encounter) and Martin Buber’s Ich-Du relation-
ship set out in Martin Buber, I and Thou,. See also Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 
154-156, and Edith Silbermann, Begegnung mit Paul Celan: Erinnerung und Interpre-
tation.
9 The term is a neologism coined by Charles Péguy, though Weil does not acknowled-
ge this anterior use. The concept of décréation is often excluded from scholarly discus-
sions of Weil’s work on the basis of its abstraction and difficulty. An attempt to situate 
the term can be found in J. P. Little, “Simone Weil’s Concept of Decreation”, Simone 
Weil’s Philosophy of Culture, 25-51. See also Miklos Veto, The Religious Metaphysics 
of Simone Weil , for one of the earliest and most rigorous discussions of décréation, and 
R. Kühn, “Le Monde comme texte. Perspectives herméneutiques chez Simone Weil”, 
Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 64: 4, 509-530 for a useful genea-
logy of the term in Maurice Blanchot, Paul Ricoeur and others. 
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methodology, in Decreation the problem of “too much self” is less an 
indictment of Carson’s own writing than a condition of writing per se.
Carson returns in Decreation to “withness” and, in doing so, returns 
the problem to the theological strictures in which it is first planted in 
her oeuvre: the “withness” of Word and God, and, more troublingly, 
the intimacy between words, God and the writer (Economy of the Un-
lost, VII).10 The book’s title essay, “Decreation: How Women like Sap-
pho, Marguerite Porete and Simone Weil Tell God”, concerns itself 
with what Carson calls the problem of “telling”. This problem seems at 
first to be strictly about praise: in Carson’s first example, how can the 
lyric poet Sappho praise Aphrodite without herself getting in the way 
of praise? In Carson’s second example, Marguerite Porete boasts the 
same ambivalence to herself as the giver and obstructor of praise, and 
consents to an ecstasy in which she separates from herself, permitting 
her to be “with” God without the “with”: “And so long as I was at ease 
and I loved myself ‘with’ him I could not at all contain myself or have 
calm…I loved myself so much along ‘with’ him that I could not answer 
loyally”, Carson quotes Porete, interpreting her “in bondage to Mar-
guerite rather than to God” (Decreation, 165-166).11 Love of the divine 
object is obstructed by the natural self-love of subjectivity; “withness” 
is a problem because it means two and not one, a subject “with” an ob-
ject. The scenario, Carson tells us, is also one of jealousy, though not 
in any straightforward sense: each writer is jealous of that presence that 
obstructs contact with the beloved object; in the cases of Sappho, Porete 
and Weil, that presence is herself. 
Carson’s essay has four parts. The first three introduce the ecstasies 
of Sappho, Porete and Weil, and the fourth ―unannounced from the 
beginning― considers the problems of writing and “telling” in the three 
authors and elevates Carson’s project to the same pitch. Writing, insofar 
as it takes part in the “theology of love” Carson describes, is seen as a 
10 See Carson, Glass, Irony and God, 51.
11  The text Carson uses is the only extant text attributed to Marguerite Porete, Le Mi-
roir des simples âmes anéanties et qui seulement demeurent en vouloir et désir d’amour, 
English translations Carson adapts are Marguerite Porete, The Mirror of Simple Souls, 
trans. E. Colledge, J. C. Marler and J. Grant and Marguerite Porete: The Mirror of Sim-
ple Souls, trans. E. Babinsky.
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point of radical tension with the ethics, desires and designs of that love 
(Decreation, 162). Writing is first announced as a problem in a strik-
ingly casuistic passage of Carson’s essay:
Inasmuch as we are now entering upon the fourth part of a three-part 
essay, we should brace ourselves for some inconsequentiality. I don’t 
feel the cause of this inconsequence is me. Rather it originates with the 
three women we are studying and the cause of it is the fact that they are 
writers. […] How are we to square [their] dark ideas with the brilliant as-
sertiveness of the writerly project shared by all three of them, the project 
of telling the world the truth about God, love and reality? The answer is 
we can’t. It’s no accident that Marguerite Porete calls her book a Mirror 
[The Mirror of Simple Souls]. To be a writer is to construct a big, loud, 
shiny centre of self from which the writing is given voice and any claim 
to be intent on annihilating this self while still continuing to write and 
give voice to writing must involve the writer in some important acts of 
subterfuge and contradiction (174). 
“I don’t feel the cause of this inconsequence is me” is an act of sub-
terfuge and contradiction all of its own. If inconsequence is a feature of 
writing, Carson suggests, it is an inevitable one, yet the subterfuges of 
Carson’s argument are not perhaps so inevitable. Carson introduces her 
presence by negating it, announcing the “big, loud, shiny centre of self” 
in whose glass we see Carson herself reflected, then occluding it by tell-
ing us that the inconsequence belongs to writing: the argument plays the 
hand it describes as a de facto trick of description, while Carson’s own 
mirror trick exposes itself alongside those she points to, glinting inside 
the writing of Weil, Porete and Sappho as each dodges her own reflec-
tion in language. 
Carson’s turn in this dance of would-be self-withdrawal makes itself 
visible in the essay’s structure. Her readings of Sappho, Porete and Weil 
are self-contained vignettes whose adjacency makes an argument: no 
case is explicitly made for their relatedness; no critical rigour or argu-
mentative leads bind the three women together in the essay. As in Econ-
omy of the Unlost, the argument is meant, we understand, to make itself 
by virtue of the authors simply being together; the lines between them 
(to quote another of Carson’s methodological confessions, this time 
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preceding a set of poems) simply “draw themselves” (Carson, Plain-
water, 93). Self-withdrawal continues at the level of language. The tone 
of the essay veers between understated, with a glaze of something like 
objectivity, and conversational, nodding personably toward the “I” of 
the critic. The strength and compulsion of Carson’s “I”, “me” and fan-
tasy interlocutor “you” drives the opening of the essay: “What if I were 
to begin an essay on spiritual matters by citing a poem that will not at 
first seem to you spiritual at all?” Invitations and remarks to this fantasy 
interlocutor ―“we”, “let’s”, “us”, alongside confessions of limitation 
such as “I don’t want to give the impression I know what this verse is 
saying or that I see where the poem is headed from here, I don’t”― sug-
gest a casualness of reading that is a designed exposure of casualness, 
non-domination and “decreation”, not by eliminating the confessional 
“I” but the sovereignty and implicit violence of its arguments.
While caught in precisely the problem it articulates, Carson’s project 
of intimacy in interpretation succeeds most clearly at the level of lan-
guage. As the section on Sappho comes to a close, Carson hones in on a 
logic within Sappho and asks and answers her own questions inside its 
terms. Inside the logic of “daring”, taking its cue from the final broken 
lines of Sappho’s “Fragment 31” (“But all is to be dared, because even 
a person of poverty”), Carson stretches the term to the outer edges of 
its assumptions: “pan tolmaton: all is to be dared” […] leads us back to 
[Sappho’s] ecstatic condition. For when an ecstatic is asked the ques-
tion, What is it that love dares the self to do? She will answer: Love 
dares the self to leave itself behind, to enter into poverty” (Decreation, 
162). A similar rhetorical intimacy is staged with Porete, as the figures 
of her writing ―“jealousy”, “divine pleasure without myself”, “my 
sense failed me”, “being which is being” and “faint[ing] away”― are 
knotted into Carson’s own leading figure, “jealousy is a dance in which 
everyone moves”. Carson is guided by the poetics of Porete: “And inso-
far as she can annihilate all these ―her term― she can resolve the three 
angles of the dance of jealousy into a single nakedness and reduce her 
being from three to two to one”. She argues not by exposition but by ex-
tension of poetic figures here, the intimacy of one language with anoth-
er. The politics of this kind of writing are finally difficult to gauge: its 
ecstasy is the withdrawal of the author behind the vivid terms and logics 
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of her object ―something we might idealise by calling immanence or 
mystify by calling “withness”― but it is also the masking of a reading.
Carson makes the dilemma of the mystic the example par excellence 
of the inherent and inherently problematic personality of writing, yet 
her own gesture remains a problem. Marguerite Porete says: “For who-
ever talks about God… must not doubt but must know without doubt… 
that he has never felt the true kernel of divine Love which makes the 
soul absolutely dazzled without being aware of it …and takes away 
absolutely the practice of telling” (Decreation, 162). In writing about 
God, the writer has to realize, Marguerite insists, that she is missing 
the point, that her awareness of the object is dazzled by the figures and 
characters of precisely that awareness, and not by the object: that the 
writer can be dazzled by the sense of her own writing. An essay about 
the forcefulness of subjectivity forces something through beneath its 
own self-confession, something we might call its lingering desire for 
itself: desire to say, to theorize, to collapse into the object it wishes to 
account for. Contradiction and the negotiation of desire is certainly a 
key part of the mystic’s experience of writing about God, and one that 
Carson inherits; yet in opening up questions of writing’s place in the 
dilemma, it serves the critic far more than it serves the mystic ―in this 
case, we’ll see, Simone Weil. 
Turning to Weil, we see that while writing for Carson is so trouble-
some, it is far less so for Weil: “In the operation of writing”, Weil says, 
“the hand which holds the pen and the body and soul attached to it are 
things infinitely small in the order of nothingness” (Decreation, 174). 
While Carson employs this quotation in an argument for the over-im-
portance of the self in writing, Weil, we might say, accepts the lie of 
writing because the liar ―the writer― is herself of small importance. 
Yet inside this acceptance is a second lie. The diminishing of the author 
is also the diminishing of history, politics and subjectivity: both lies 
offer us ―just as they offer Carson― grounds for a confrontation of 
writing and critical practice.
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II
Weil’s desire to know God beyond the subjective compound Weil-with-
God takes its place in a lifelong negative theology theorized by Weil in 
her private notebooks, her posthumously published lectures on philoso-
phy at a lycée in Le Puy, her lengthy correspondence with the Catholic 
priest, Father Jean-Marie Perrin, and the handful of works published in 
her lifetime. Carson quotes one of the most poignant passages of Weil’s 
notebooks on precisely this concern: “If only I knew how to disappear 
there would be a perfect union of love between God and the earth I 
tread, the sea I hear...” (Decreation, 168-169).12 Weil is the “unwel-
come third” (“le tiers importun”) here: “placed between two lovers”, 
she “ought to go away so that they can really be together” (“avec deux 
fiancés et doit s’en aller afin qu’ils soient vraiment ensemble”, Grav-
ity and Grace, 41). Her sensual apprehension of the world (“the earth 
I tread, the sea I hear”) senses the potential of a union without herself. 
In Weil’s ethics, self-withdrawal is a “tact[ful]” gesture, and one of im-
mense grace ―grace, Weil tells us that “fills spaces, but cannot enter 
except where there is a void to receive it” (“comble, mais elle ne peut 
entrer que là où il y a un vide pour la recevoir”, La Pesanteur et la 
grace, 12). Culmination of the gesture of self-withdrawal, “void” here 
means denuding oneself of the capacity to imagine God, and for Weil 
this cull of imagination is crucial.13 Relating to God requires forms of 
subjectlessness and objectlessness, both of which offer ways of think-
ing about critical reading. 
Weil asks the reader of God precisely not to read Him: “Try to love 
without imagining. To love the appearance in its nakedness and with-
out interpretation. What one loves then is truly God” (“Essayer d’aimer 
sans imaginer. Aimer l’apparence nue et sans interprétation. Ce qu’on 
aime alors est vraiment Dieu” (Gravity and Grace, 54; La Pesanteur et 
la grâce, 61). To love without imagining here is to love without desir-
ing, for to desire is to imagine the beloved and to seek an equivalent of 
12 Carson references Gravity and Grace, 88-89.
13 Weil articulates her opposition to imagination in Gravity and Grace, in Waiting on 
God, and in her Lectures on Philosophy, 193. 
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his image in a world where the beloved is not. Elsewhere in her notes, 
Weil proposes the “extinction of desire (Buddhism) ―or detachment― 
or amor fati ―or desire for the absolute good― these all amount to the 
same: to empty desire, finality of all content, to desire in the void, to de-
sire without any wishes. To detach our desire from all good things and 
to wait” (“Détacher notre désir de tous les biens et attendre”, Gravity 
and Grace, 13; La Pesanteur et la grâce, 15). Yet Weil’’s case is not for 
desirelessness but for objectless desire ―“to detach our desire”, “to de-
sire in the void, to desire without any wishes”. Her plea for objectless-
ness recalls what Sigmund Freud calls “evenly suspended attention”, 
desiring the analysand’s content without wishing it to mean anything in 
particular.14 “Wishes” here believe in and desire “finality of content”, 
a finality that is the very source of Weil’s anxiety about desire: desire 
makes the object something it is not; our tendencies to define, resolve 
and fix the object of desire are more concerned with the satisfaction of 
desire than with attention to its object.15 
Weil takes the question of desire further still. The self-sensing qual-
ity of desire that reads in the object the fulfillment of its own wish can 
even create its own objects where originally there were none. This is 
of course especially true in the case of an absent God, but its lessons 
invite us to consider interpretation as relationship to something not en-
tirely present to the critic or to the language he uses to describe it; to 
consider criticism as descriptions of a necessary estrangement from the 
work. Weil warns us against interpreting the divine object for two rea-
sons: firstly, that to interpret (for Weil) is to interject deliberate fantasy 
between oneself and one’s object; and secondly, that this object ―by 
default and by necessity, Weil will argue― is absent. The impoverish-
ment of subjectivity and the absence of the object seem to be condi-
tional on each other for Weil: if we accept that God is absent to us, we 
also accept the limitation on our subjectivity with regard to sensing or 
interpreting Him; likewise, in accepting the limitation of subjectivity, 
14 See Sigmund Freud, “Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-analy-
sis”, The Standard edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 
12, 109-120.
15 We can observe parallels with Theodor W. Adorno’s critique of the self-compla-
cency of criticism. See Theodor W. Adorno, Prisms, 27, 34; Aesthetic Theory, 440,423.
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renouncing the “faux” or “falsity” of imagination, God’s absence to the 
world is a raw and vertiginous sensation. In Attente de Dieu (Waiting 
on God, 1950), she describes “a kind of horror [that] submerges the 
whole soul. During this absence there is nothing to love” (66). The 
twin voids of subject and object match each other in Weil’s theology. 
The question arising out of this double impoverishment is how the 
object is sensed, and sensed as other than oneself, given the flatten-
ing out of subjectivity and the uncertain status of the object as object. 
So vehemently against its interpretation, Weil seems to be saying that 
the divine object must not be known, an unknowability that takes the 
question of its survival to a new level. We should then ask why this 
unknowable object comes to be prized over knowledge of it at all, and 
how, then, to write about it.
One of Weil’s more curious notes on the subject goes as follows:
Attention is what seizes hold of reality, so that the greater the attention 
on the part of the mind, the greater the amount of real being in the object 
(Notebooks of Simone Weil, vol. 2, 527).
(Ce qui aisait la realité est l’attention, de sorte que plus la penseé est 
attentive, plus l’objet en est plein d’être)16
Attention is what makes an object real, she suggests: attention makes 
an object an object in the first place. Weil seems to say that real being or 
“plein d’ être” (an alternative translation might be “fullness of being”) is 
constituted at least in part in the subject’s act of attending, a proposition 
that casts the object’s autonomous being into doubt. Weil’s syntax may 
be misleading here ―it should be remembered that the quotation comes 
from a collection of personal notes, not a finished work― but she seems 
to be saying not that attention enables us to see more “real being” in the 
object, rather that attention causes the object’s being to be. Invoking 
relation to God, Weil says that attention turns our awareness “onto that 
which cannot be conceived”: attention gives us access to the inconceiv-
able, but it also, if we follow what she says about “plein d’être”, allows 
16 Simone Weil, “Cahiers (Juillet 1942- Juillet 1943)”, Œuvres complètes, 6 vols. 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1989-2006), vol. 4 (2006); “Cahier 3”, 174.
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us to conceive the inconceivable out of nothing (Notebooks of Simone 
Weil, vol. 1, 179).
Weil’s equation of knowledge and fantasy leaves us in a difficult po-
sition. Her critique of divine knowledge suggests that a better way to 
sense the difference between ourselves and our objects of desire is to know 
nothing, to feel the force of nothing instead of fantasy.17 Relationship 
is pushed to its limits in Weil because she asks us to feel nothing ―not 
something― as resistance. The dangers of this position in disciplines 
other than theology are, I think, too clear to need stating.18 Moreover 
it is difficult to see how Weil’s ethics of interpretation translates into 
a critical ethics without falling into the trap of reading the “nothing” 
(objectlessness) of Weil’s relationship with God as a cue to subjectivity 
to romp wherever it pleases because it encounters no limit, senses itself 
in “tension” with nothing. Yet Weil’s position demands at least a brief 
reflection on what this “nothing” might mean for interpretation in the 
humanities: the value, perhaps, of recognizing what is not grasped, not 
resolved, not wanted, not yet even read, in the object of interpretation. 
Weil returns to the question of this not-yet-object, this time focusing 
on the desires surrounding it:
Descend to the source of desires to wrench the energy from its object. It 
is there that desires are true insofar as they are energy. It is the object that 
is false. But there is an unspeakable wrench in the soul at the separation 
of a desire and its object. 
If we descend into ourselves, we find that we possess exactly what 
we desire. 
17 The word “fantasy” comes with strong psychoanalytic associations, e.g. Freud’s 
argument in Studies in Hysteria (1893) that the hysteric patient’s fantasy of seduction 
and a “genuine” seduction mean the same for the patient, and are equally “real”. Fan-
tasy in the context of Weil’s arguments would mean indifference to whether the object 
is, finally, real or not.
18 We can see a similar though more worldly ethics in Emmanuel Levinas’s Totality 
and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority and Maurice Blanchot’s The Infinite Conversation. 
In both texts, the irreducibility of the Other not only to my understanding of him but 
to my descriptions of that understanding (both of which are forms of totalization) is 
expressed as that Other’s infinity.
Acta Poetica 341, 2013, pp. 127-154 143
(Descendre à la source des désirs pour arracher l’énergie à son objet. 
C’est là que les désirs sont vrais en tant qu’énergie. C’est l’objet qui est 
faux. Mais arrachement indicible dans l’âme à la séparation d’un désir 
et de son objet. 
Si l’on descend en soi-même, on trouve qu’on possède exactement ce 
qu’on désire19 (La Pesanteur et la grâce, 25).
The object of desire is a fantasy, says Weil, and one we possess be-
cause it comes from ourselves. For Weil, it is the energy of desire that 
in its imageless truth inhabits the world, while (the image of) the object 
has no existence outside our own imagination. It is not desire’s energy 
that is autoerotic but the object of desire. At first glance, her final sen-
tence betrays the sense it inherits from the previous and seems to trans-
late as: we already possess this (false) object so have no need of another 
(genuine) one. Yet for Weil’s theology, possessing this “false” object 
means radical incompletion. Having and knowing the object renders it 
automatically false, whereas the energy of desire for unknown quanti-
ties of the object is what is real for Weil. Desire for what in the work of 
art or literature remains estranged from the work of criticism, the very 
aspects that provoke desire because they remain apart from and irreduc-
ible to that desire, is the mode of critical subjectivity Weil’s theology 
invites us to consider. 20 
The above are examples of how, for Weil, interpretation can turn 
nothing into something and something into something else. The ques-
tion that brings Weil’s theorizations more sharply into dialogue with 
Carson’s project as a critic, however, is how these theorizations are 
written: in the texture and textuality of nothingness or the fullness, reso-
lution and desire of which Weil and Carson both speak. In a typical 
19 Following Emma Craufurd, I use the pronoun “we”, rather than the more precise 
translation “one”. Other than this final sentence, I retain the syntactically rough notatio-
nal style of Weil’s original. See Gravity and Grace, 22.
20 For Meister Eckhart and the traditions of mystical thought in his wake, communi-
cable and incommunicable aspects of the divine were distinct categories with distinct 
theologies. See Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism 
and Jacques Derrida on Eckhart’s negative theology in Jacques Derrida, “How to Avoid 
Speaking: Denials”, Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of Negativity in Literature 
and Literary Theory, 3-70, see especially 20, 52, 69 (note 28).
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passage from Weil’s unedited notebooks, we see just how casuistic and 
enclosed Weil’s logic can be:
God created me as a non-being which has the appearance of existing, in 
order that through love I should renounce this apparent existence and be 
annihilated by the plenitude of being [...] The ‘I’ belongs to non-being. 
But I have not the right to know this. If I knew it, where would be the 
renunciation? I shall never know it (First and Last Notebooks, 96-97). 
Judging by the syntax alone, Weil seems to be thinking on the spot, 
improvising a dialectical logic. Yet as Sharon Cameron notes in a dis-
cussion of Weil’s “impersonality”, the “I” in this same passage has been 
deprived of its particularity; it is positional rather than substantive, far 
from the unguided and self-referring subject of improvisation. In her 
finished works, Weil’s near-constant use of the pronoun “soi” (third per-
son indefinite: an English equivalent is “one”) marks a clear rejection of 
autobiography in favour of abstraction (Dargan, Simone Weil: Thinking 
Poetically, 5). Alongside Weil’s cold authorial “I” is the fate to which 
she condemns it: an “I” deprived of the right to know that it is not. Fol-
lowing these theorizations, we might ask whether Weil’s writing is a 
form of desire or possession or both, and to what extent, though “the 
hand which holds the pen and the body and soul attached to it are things 
infinitely small in the order of nothingness”, the presence of desire and/
or possession can be felt in the operations of Weil’s writing. 
Scholars tend to agree that Weil’s writing is impersonal, and that this 
impersonality is a form of decreation.21 Joan Dargan speculates: “Per-
haps writing itself was for Weil a process of decreation ―the poetic 
imagination employed in the service of an impulse toward the univer-
sal. […] it is exclusive rather than inclusive, insofar as the presence of 
the speaker is concerned”(Simone Weil: Thinking Poetically, 5). This 
21 See Dargan, Simone Weil: Thinking Poetically, 5-9 and Sharon Cameron’s “The 
Practice of Attention”. Other discussions of Weil’s impersonality include Claire Wolf-
teich, “Attention or Destruction: Simone Weil and the Paradox of the Eucharist”, The 
Journal of Religion, 81:3 (July 2001), 359-376, and Christopher Hamilton, “Simone 
Weil’s ‘Human Personality’: Between the Personal and the Impersonal”, Harvard 
Theological Review, 98:2 (2005), 187-207. See also Gillian Rose’s critique in “Angry 
Angels ― Simone Weil and Emmanuel Levinas” which I discuss below.
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reading gives Weil’s philosophy the benefit of the doubt, lets it off the 
hook with an argument for its internal coherence. Dargan suggests that 
although Weil’s writing excludes its speaker ―Weil herself― it is im-
pelled to include on a universal level, to include all subjects (and by 
implication none) by not distinguishing between subjects at all. 
As a reader, however, Weil desires the particular ―the particulari-
ties of history, of subjects and of the author. Writing in L’Enracinement 
(The Need for Roots, 1949), she critiques the “so-called historical spirit 
[that] does not pierce the paper to find flesh and blood; it consists in a 
subordination of thought to the document” (“L’espirit dit historique ne 
perce pas le papier pour trouver de la chair et du sang; il consiste en 
une subordination de la pensée au document”, 283).22 Another form of 
sovereignty, “the document” is used here as a critique of the reader, the 
“historical mind” who sees the text as a set of opaque facts, and as a cri-
tique of the workings of ideology on the flesh and blood of history: Weil 
instead asks us to “read between the lines to transport oneself fully” 
(283-284). In this model the reader is in charge, and yet Weil’s desire 
for this “flesh and blood” ―of the writer or of the written― alerts us 
to a struggle inside the rigours of decreation. This struggle is nowhere 
clearer than in the relationship between Weil’s ethics and her way of 
writing.
In a section of Gravity and Grace titled “Readings” by Thibon, 
Weil’s theory of reading is a vision of a universal right to interpret 
and be interpreted particularly, the opposite of which is domination: 
“Every being cries out silently to be read differently. We read, but also 
we are read by others [...]. Forcing someone to read as we read him 
(slavery)” (135). We might recall the way Carson’s critical prose is 
guided by the logic and the poetics of its objects, and both the casuist-
ries and clear successes of that gesture. Weil’s theory of reading and 
the readability of her own writing are inconsistent with one another in 
different way. Arguing for Weil’s commitment to “creative thought” 
and “the discernment of the reader”, Dargan is critical of the appar-
22 We can link Weil’s assertion to Walter Benjamin’s historical materialism: Benjamin 
notes around the same time that because of the “anonymous toil” of human flesh and 
blood, “there is no document of civilisation that is not also a document of barbarism”. 
See Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History”, Illuminations, 256.
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ently un-reader-friendly nature of Weil’s prose: Weil’s writing seems 
not allow in its reading for the kinds of creative freedom it sets out 
in theory. Dargan’s problem with the Weil oeuvre is that the texts are 
“uninhabitable and there is no room for argument […] one assents or 
one does not (Simone Weil: Thinking Poetically, 51).” In Weil’s unac-
commodating style “it is impossible to stay in one’s own terms” (51). 
Her writing is so sure, so complete, that for all its sensitivity to forms 
of domination, its demand for the undoing of the creature, Weil’s prose 
dominates its reader.
A more forceful and damning account of Weil’s writing is the Brit-
ish philosopher Gillian Rose’s essay “Angry Angels: Simone Weil and 
Emmanuel Levinas” (1993) in which she sets out Weil and Levinas’s 
critiques of the other’s faith ― Christianity and Judaism (Judaism and 
Modernity , 211-223). Reading Weil’s notes on Israel in La Pesanteur 
et la grâce and her essay “Human Personality” (1943) alongside Levi-
nas’s “Simone Weil Against the Bible” (1952), Rose explains that both 
critiques propose something about the other faith that the critique itself 
repeats: the “weak spot” shared by Levinas and Weil is the violence of 
their critique of the violence of faith. For Rose, Weil misreads Judaism 
as a faith of (and in) violence, projecting there her “confessional other”; 
Levinas’s attack on Weil’s Christianity projects a violence for which 
he criticises her: both, argues Rose, “expose the intrinsic violence of 
the sovereign individual towards herself, her others and towards God” 
(212) Their accounts fail as ethics because both “claim [...] violently 
that violence is cultivated elsewhere” (221).  
Recalling Weil’s own sensibilities, Rose proposes that “knowledge 
has this structure of sovereign and solitary violence” (215). Yet plac-
ing this Weilian understanding of knowledge and its discourses next 
to Weil’s own imperative not to know, we find ourselves at a loss: how 
might we turn these lessons from Weil and her most erudite readers 
back onto the question of critical interpretation without taking them 
where Carson does in her essay on “Decreation” ―without turning the 
problem into just another of thought’s “best moments”? (Economy of 
the Unlost, VII). For Rose, both Weil and Levinas are phenomenologists 
of this structure of violence, of “the conflict of good and evil, of atten-
tion and force or of substitution and possession” (Judaism and Moder-
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nity, 219).23 Both reproduce in their mode of address the violence they 
seek to expose in the other, and yet:
Instead of confessing and configuring the paradox of authorship, each 
accuses the other faith of not allowing for the ever-threatening contami-
nation of the Good by violence (212). 
The “paradox of authorship” recalls the paradox or “problem of tell-
ing” that Carson attends and succumbs to in “Decreation”: that writ-
ing both affirms and denies the author, and that her writing binds her 
to forms of resolution and definition that can close down productive 
forms of tension and meaning in the critical object.24 The absence of 
what she calls a “confession” in Weil is, for Rose, a clandestine form 
of violence; without it, and without the “humour and irony” essential 
to such a confession, the writer’s careful and hermeneutically sensitive 
prose becomes a form of domination. Recalling Lukács’s celebrated 
critique of description, “Narrate or Describe?” (1936),25 Rose rebukes 
Weil’s discourse for its loftiness, its distance from “the world” and its 
failure to “suspend and resume the ethical with its features of modern 
state and society” (Judaism and Modernity, 221).26 The abstraction and 
otherworldliness of her ethics not only shuts down political or worldly 
23 With “attention”, Rose refers to Weil’’s Attente de Dieu; with “force”, to Weil’’s 
spectacular essay on the Iliad, “L’’Iliade, ou le poème de la force” (1939-40), in which 
Weil theorises the conversion of beings into things in the phenomena of war. 
24 The “paradox of authorship” means more than this for Rose. In The Broken Middle, 
she writes that “The ‘crisis’ consists in having to take our bearings from the works and 
not, as we are prone to do, the works from our bearings ―yet the work is determined to 
abandon its reader and dissolve its author.” Gillian Rose, The Broken Middle 19.
25 For Lukács, the problem is historical: the failure of description to announce “the 
relationship of observation to creation” ―how experience becomes a communica-
tion― makes description complicit in the “artistry” of social ideology and prevents 
the subject from seeing his own implication in history. See Gyorgy Lukács, “Narrate or 
Describe?”, Writer and Critic, 121.
26 Rose is not alone in her criticism of Weil for suspending the political: in the same 
year as “Angry Angels” was published, the former Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan 
Williams flagged up the impoverishment of Weil’s discourse on the human, the social 
and the political, while Richard H. Bell alerted us to the irreconcilability of elements 
such as decreation to an ethics in the world. See Rowan Williams, “The Necessary non-
existence of God”, Simone Weil’s Philosophy of Culture, 52-76.
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dimensions but leaves her highly conspicuous, unable to “pass unno-
ticed” in the text (222).27 In “Our existence is made only out of [God’s] 
waiting for our consent not to exist” (“Notre existence n’est faite que 
de son attente, de notre consentement à ne pas exister” La Pesanteur 
et la grâce, 36).28 Weil’s discourse is out of reach, the exclusiveness/
all-inclusiveness of the “soi” or the universalising decree of the “notre” 
remain aloof to their own fallibility. Weil’s spirituality is, for her, “the 
representation of the law” and her writing confirms it (Judaism and Mo-
dernity, 216).29 Whether hers is an exposition or a domination of the 
dilemma of telling depends, of course, on how we read Weil, on what 
we are able to do, finally, inside the law of her writing.
III
How might Weil’s writing be written about without replicating precise-
ly the tensions that produce this paradox ―of writing that preserves 
its own cohort of violence while theorizing non-violence and non-
domination? Rose has suggested that this “paradox of authorship” goes 
unconfessed in Weil, and that confession of the acts and strictures of 
writing might be a means of salvation from them. We saw in Carson’s 
“Decreation” that merely stating as fact what she calls the “subterfuge 
and contradiction” of writing is not enough: that this form of naming 
slips all too smoothly into the subterfuge it describes, without interrup-
tion or ―to use another of Rose’s terms― “configuration” of its basic 
paradoxes. 
Following Carson’s essay on “Decreation”, her opera libretto of the 
same name reprises the themes of the essay while taking these themes 
to another level. At this level, Weil’s questions about interpretation and 
relationship are treated to a form of answer in the poetry of the li-
27 quoting Gustave Thibon.
28 For help with Weil’s complicated syntax, I have consulted Craufurd’s translation: 
Gravity and Grace, 32.
29 We can contrast, for example, the exalted confessional “I” of other mystic writers 
including Marguerite Porete, St. Teresa of Avila, Meister Eckhart and Sor Juana Inés de 
la Cruz.
Acta Poetica 341, 2013, pp. 127-154 149
bretto, which works as an alternative critical response to the concerns 
of Sappho, Porete and Weil. Like the essay, the three-part “Decreation” 
libretto divides its attention between themes deriving from the three 
authors. Moving between bathos and the high drama of a mystery 
play, “Love’s Forgery”, based on the “jealous” scenario of Sappho’s 
“Fragment 31”, casts Hephaistos and Aphrodite (to whose cult of wor-
ship Sappho is thought to have belonged) in a love triangle with Ares, 
the Greek god of war; the second part, “Her Mirror of Simple Souls”, 
stages the trial and condemnation of Marguerite Porete by a chorus of 
papal inquisitors who indict Porete in Latin and English; and the final 
part, “Fight Cherries”, dramatizes the final moments of Weil’s life as a 
struggle with hunger and desire, set out in dialogues between Weil and 
her parents. 
Even as it stages the extremes of desire, religious ecstasy and death by 
starvation, the opera is a work of supreme camp (titles of duets include 
“Duet of the Sleeveless Sports Blouses avec Maman”, “Parental Inter-
lude”, “Aria of Last Cherries”, to give an idea). Marguerite Porete and 
Simone Weil, both of whom feature in the opera’s dramatis personae, 
deliver and distort tenets of their own work. In the “Decreation” essay 
Marguerite Porete is quoted (“Jealous he is truly! He shows it by his 
works which have stripped me of myself absolutely and have placed 
me in divine pleasure without myself” (164), whereas in the opera she 
is parodied: 
M[arguerite Porete]: Jealous he is truly!
For he has parted me from myself
Absolutely
By a ravishing farness nearer than my own self! 
[…]
M: Jealous he is truly!
For he has annihilated me 
as myself 
absolutely 
and born me new as nothingness in no self! 
(210-211)
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Carson makes Marguerite Porete’s points about the non-presence of 
God in an unraveled and rebound version of her language. The effect 
―parodic or guided by the mystic’s own poesis― is the simultaneous 
saying and unsaying of Porete’s own discourse, a representation of the 
hit and miss of critical response, and a movement in and out of the work 
that tests and pushes the boundaries between criticism and its object. 
The opera plays on a dialectic that belongs to critical reading: criticism 
desires the work of art while manipulating and sampling that work to 
the critic’s advantage. Carson stages the desires and vanities of inter-
pretation in her experiments with original texts, accompanying Porete, 
Sappho and Weil inside their own paradox of authorship ―the paradox 
of their farness and nearness to the object of desire.
Carson works inside the paradox she defines for Weil in the “Decre-
ation” essay: between desire for the object ―God― and acceptance 
that such an object is by nature astray. True to this paradox, the “Fight 
Cherries” section of the libretto is reconstituted Weil ready for con-
sumption as Carson, pulling and teasing Weil’s language into parodies 
that confess themselves as somewhere between Weil and Carson, be-
tween a resistant object and a response that gives form to it, whatever 
subterfuge and contradiction that might involve. The libretto tours the 
theoretical highlights of the Weil oeuvre: “Imagination which fills up 
the void is essentially a liar”; “Grace can only enter where there is void 
to receive it” and so on, in duets between Carson’s characters (226). 
Yet this saying is also the unsaying of Weil. Carson ties Weil’s terms 
in knots, undoes them, turns them through word games, repetitions and 
rhetorical questions to the point of parody. Carson quotes a short (fabri-
cated) letter from Weil to her mother: 
“Chère Maman I have bought two sleeveless sports / blouses Today a 
street fight between Nazis and / Communists No I was not there! Please 
send / me special post what I asked for last / letter (the Hegel) Kisses”. 
She proceeds to mix up the words until the coherence of the letter is lost, 
but other, dormant forms of sense emerge: “Chère Maman I was spe-
cial there I / bought less Hegel Please Today have / Nazis send blouses 
between sports / I asked what Communists kissed / me for (two fight 
sleeves) / No not last post!”. 
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By the end of the sequence, Carson’s burlesque Weil announces to 
her mother: “No special Maman sport to the last / fight two less / kiss 
sleeves Today! / cher Hegel […] I create myself by work. / Or else I 
panic ― / that is to say, / chère Maman out of my way!” (233) Carson’s 
parodies and misquotations romp inside the law of Weil’s rigid decrees, 
testing that law, it seems, but also searching for something more essen-
tially Weilian (or Carsonian) in its destruction.
Yet the point of this pastiche is perhaps more complex. Carson tells 
us in the prologue to “Fight Cherries” that Weil’s letters home “are rep-
etitions of the one same glowingly factitious postcard that every good 
daughter sends home”: the mixing up and reconstitution of the letters 
represents a very particular act of evasion and a very particular absence 
of the object (Weil, Carson, Decreation, 223). In the context of Carson’s 
discourse on telling, the manipulation of this fictitious text ―and a va-
riety of other near-quotations in the final part― speaks back to her “De-
creation” essay as a response to its central problem: how the manifold 
attractions of writing can outdo the object of the writer’s attentions, a 
problem that becomes acute in the case of God for whom the writing is 
up to a certain point a substitute.30 In the opera, the dialectic of two writ-
ings (Weil’s and Carson’s) is exposed by their closeness and by parody 
of the source text, yet the absurdity of Carson’s burlesque interventions, 
the uses to which she puts Weil, disband her own authority as a writer 
and throw the status of the twin “Decreation” texts entirely askew. As 
the libretto uses and “comments” on the material of the essay, the two 
texts unsettle each other and disorient any reader who hopes to come 
away with a meaningful sense of what criticism and literary work are 
doing there, and how separable the two finally are. 
Here, Carson is in fundamentally Weilian territory. Unlike the ten-
sions, ironies and confessions of Carson’s, Weil’s writing does not turn 
the problem of her object’s absence into its own feature. Yet the paradox 
of authorship that makes the writer by default too present and too ab-
30 See Michel de Certeau’s arguments on the Eucharist and other forms of incar-
nation, verbal and material: Michel de Certeau, The Mystic Fable: The Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries, 79. 
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sent is at the centre of her theology. For Weil, the “I” is at once nothing 
and just too substantial, irrelevant and an obstruction to the object of 
her attention. For Carson, this theology inspires a critical practice with 
wide implications for criticism and interpretation: a critical practice that 
confesses and plays with its own role in reading, and a critical reader 
who senses, engages and believes in what evades her in the work, what 
resists before the interpretation is cast. 
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